FOLD Staking Roadmap/Timeline
- January 2024: Launch of Relay MEV Protection as a Service, enabling protection against transaction leakage through block collation
- Before December 30, 2024: Implementation of Block Builder Rewards retention through new multisig address system
- February 2025 (worst case): First staking reward payout, contingent on 1 ETH accumulation threshold
- Before Q1 2025: AVS Launch(s), starting with AVS Boost as the initial underwriting risk source
Critical Action Item
- Establish new multisig address configuration to retain Block Builder Rewards instead of directing them solely to validators
- Monitor accumulation of rewards to meet the 1 ETH threshold requirement for initial payout
- Prepare for AVS Boost integration as the first external underwriting risk source for premium earnings
- Implement the Relay MEV Protection service to secure transaction processing
Important Note: Block Builder Rewards are designated as the primary source of payouts until the Captive Insurance underwriting phase begins. The 1 ETH accumulation threshold serves as a key milestone for initiating reward distributions.
Block Builder Performance
Over the last 30 days Average ~0.09756432 ETH with the largest payout being 1.74608215 ETH (Slot 10482936)
With the Relay Protection Service we feel this will generate more exclusive Orderflow improving the block builder. Additionally with the relay being added back to Lido that will vastly improve the builder (the builder does not submit to any other relays). Additionally latency preference changes will make it more competitive (as it has additional time to submit bids).
Relay Protection as a Service
This is basically XGA v1 minus the call market: i.e. it is related to the relay changes that were made to accommodate v1. Primarily, this involves the merging of transactions (re: collation is the term used).
Platforms MEV-Share and MEV-Blocker have seen slow adoption in the market: by implementing a trusted intermediary model that partially exposes transaction information to facilitate strategic trading positions, this results in transaction information leakage.[1]
The system maintains complete transaction privacy until validator commitment, followed by full disclosure – a mechanism that market participants say delivers superior operational efficiency through comprehensive off-chain state information.
The key differential is the revenue model, as users retain the majority of trading profits rather than sharing them with validators, fundamentally altering market incentives.
We want to emphasize that this service is a striped down version of XGA v1, it is already built. The only thing that is needed is business development related to get projects and user attention such that it sees usage.
Relay Protect vs MEV Share / MEV Blocker
| Feature | MEV-Share/Blocker | Relay Protect |
|---|---|---|
| Initial Processing | Routes through trusted intermediary | Enters private transaction pool |
| Privacy Level | Partial - leaks transaction hints | Complete privacy until validator commitment |
| Information Flow | Gradual disclosure via hints | Binary - fully private then fully public |
| Backrunning Efficiency | Limited by partial information | Higher efficiency due to complete state knowledge |
| Revenue Distribution | Significant share goes to validators | Users retain majority of profits |
| Inter-transaction Dynamics | Limited by information availability | Enables organic backrunning between bundle transactions (OpenMEV Router) |
| Validator Role | Acts as active intermediary and profit sharer | Primarily transaction executor |
Summary
If you have questions please feel free to reach out to me on Telegram Chat.
As for the MultiSig we are proposing the following:
1 Community Member chosen by the Team 1 Community Member voted on 2 FOLD Whales (non team members) 2 Team Members
Thank you to Messi for highlighting this issue and providing concrete proof. ↩︎